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PUBLIC SCHOOL REGULATIONS
than at the trial court level. Allowing the verdict winner the right to
argue conditionally for a new trial either at the trial court level or the
appellate level seems to ignore the practicalities of advocacy, and indeed
of human nature. Only a verdict winner who has been deprived of his
verdict can argue meaningfully for a new trial, and he should have the
right to argue his case to the trial judge who saw and heard the case.
RALEIGH A. SHOEMAKER
Constitutional Law-Public School Authorities Regulating
the Style of a Student's Hair
The availability of public education is often subject to compliance
with school regulations governing student appearance and conduct.
Courts have jurisdiction by way of mandamus or otherwise to review the
legality of such regulations and may order reinstatement or enrollment
when the exclusion is made pursuant to regulations that are unreason-
able, arbitrary, or discriminatory, or when the exclusion infringes upon
some constitutional right.' Following this standard, courts have upheld
expulsion for using cosmetics, wearing objectionable clothing,2 smoking,3
serving liquor to other students,4 marriage,5 creating school bus disturb-
ances,0 and even writing a letter to a newspaper in which the student
was "fanatical in his [favorable] views as to atheism. ' 7
In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District,8 a public high school
principal refused to enroll three students-members of a musical group
known as "Sounds Unlimited"-because the length and style of their
hair could "cause commotion, trouble, distraction, and a disturbance in
school."'" The students claimed that the regulations prescribing appear-
ance constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable violation of their consti-
'The Legal Status of the Public School Pupil, 26 N.E.A. RESEARCH BuLL.
28 (1948).
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
'Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
'State v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
' State v. Board of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957).
'In re Neal, 164 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Child. Ct. 1957).
Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
'392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1968).
OId. at 698.
'Old. at 699.
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tutional rights to freedom of expression and privacy. The federal district
court denied their petition for injunctive relief,' holding that the school
authorities had acted with reasonable discretion.' 2 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, with Judge Tuttle dissenting. 8
While the decision has many implications concerning curtailment of
the right to privacy where the mere likelihood of school disorder exists,
14
the court in Ferrell hardly touched the issue.' 5 The court declared that
even assuming that haircuts are a constitutionally protected mode of
expression under the first amendment, such a right was subordinate to
the state's interest in operating an efficient school system."6 A similar
contention by Mayor Hague thirty years earlier, however, was refuted
by the Supreme Court, which said:
"Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
The district court accepted jurisdiction on the basis of the constitutional issues
involved, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
12261 F. Supp. 545, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1966), reviewed in, A Student's Right to
Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. PuB. L. 151 (1968); 20 ALA. L. Rv.
104 (1967).
18392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968). An abundance of prior statutory and case
law in many states upholds the right to grant their school officials almost un-
limited discretion in governing the behavior and appearance of students attend-
ing their public schools, limited only by the requirement of reasonableness. See
Langenbach, The Power of School Officials to Regulate Student Appearance, 3
HARv. LEG. COMM. 1 (1966); 1 PORTIA L.J. 258 (1966); Note, The Right to
Dress and Go to School, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 492 (1965).
" The students claimed their hair was an important asset to the popularity
of their musical group, thus the school officials' action prevented them from
following their chosen occupation free from unreasonable governmental inter-
ference in violation of the liberty and property concepts of the fifth amendment.
The court recognized such a right, but rejected the claim that it was unreason-
ably infringed upon. 392 F.2d at 703.
" But see Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Leonard v.
School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965); Marshall v. Oliver, Case
No. B-2932 (Cir. Ct. Richmond, Nov. 28, 1965) (unpublished opinion), appeal
denied, 207 Va. xcix, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966) (college student denied
enrollment in a state college because of long hair). The issue of privacy was
presented to the court in Ferrell. See Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae at 6, 7
and Brief for Appellee at 18, 19, Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d
697 (5th Cir. 1968).
1 392 F.2d at 703. The court in Ferrell also considered the subordinate claim
that the school regulation was discriminatory under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1964), but dismissed such claims, citing Byrd v. Sexton,
277 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1960). In Byrd a black student claimed the imposition
of an enrollment fee to attend public high school was discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1964). Since the issue of race was
not involved, the court refused to extend the statutes, holding any invasion of
the student's right to attend the school without paying the fee was an invasion
of a personal, not a civil right.
[Vol. 47
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[U] ncontrolled official supression of the privilege [freedom of speech]
cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connec-
tion with the exercise of that right.17
When the court assumes that a student's hairstyle is protected under
the first amendment,' it becomes susceptible to the attack of the
dissenting opinion,"9 namely that the state had failed to demonstrate that
the petitioners' hairstyle clearly and seriously impeded the educational
process enough to justify such invasion of the first amendment right."0 A
possible justification for the majority position can be found in the opinion
of United States v. O'Brien,2 where the Supreme Court dismissed the
idea that all types of symbolic conduct are protected speech under the
first amendment, and rejected the claim that burning a draft card before
a public audience is protected symbolic speech.' Moreover, if a student's
right to wear long hair were protected by first amendment freedom of
expression, it is unclear whether a student has even a qualified right
to compel the state to supply a platform-the school-for him to exer-
cise that right.'
Perhaps the court's analysis and treatment of first amendment protec-
tion in Ferrell developed from positions it had taken in previous cases
dealing with overtly symbolic speech. But the procedure adopted in
Ferrell, in justifying infringement on the first amendment right, differs
significantly from the procedure used in its previous decisions.
For instance, in Blackwell v. Board of Educatio24 and Burnside v.
17 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939). See also Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
"0 392 F.2d at 702. In Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. La.
1967), the district court, when faced with the same factual situation, did not
accept hair style as protected under the first amendment. Hair style, in order to
be a symbol of speech, must express something, but "what does it express?
Nothing." Id. at 527. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
10 392 F.2d at 705.
0 "[T]he constitutional rights of an individual cannot be denied him because
his exercise of them produces violent reaction by those who would deprive him
of the very right he seeks to assert." Id. at 705. The disruptive reactions of
fellow students "should be prohibited, not the expression of individuality by the
suspended students." Id. at 706.
-1391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 376.
22See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 30, 43 (1966) (involving the arrest of
students for staging a protest picket on public jail property). In Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965), civil rights picketing was held to be symbolic speech pro-
tected under the first amendment, but the Supreme Court in Adderty held that
the state had "the right to control the use of its own property for its own lawful
non-discriminatory purpose," regardless of the first amendment rights of the pro-
testors. 385 U.S. at 43.2'363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Byars, 5 this same court used different reasoning in cases involving high
school students who wore freedom buttons inscribed with civil rights
slogans. Granting that such buttons were overtly symbolic speech, the
court seemed to require proof of disruption in fact to justify infringe-
ment upon first amendment rights." Thus, in Blackwell, after analyzing
various sorts of empirical data, the court found actual disruption and
upheld the school officials' actions barring the buttons." But in Burn-
side, the court held that school officials had failed to demonstrate suffi-
cient actual disturbance to justify similar restrictions.2 Both decisions
stress that the educational process involves the grant of considerable
discretionary power to teachers and administrators .2  Together these
companion cases seem to imply that discretionary power necessary to the
orderly functioning of the public schools cannot infringe upon rights of
free expression unless a connection between the prohibited conduct and
disruption in fact can be clearly demonstrated. Furthermore, in Black-
well, the degree of restriction was reasonable-controversial and disrup-
tive buttons can be worn outside school hours. In sum, a reasonable
exercise of discretion, resulting in regulations calculated to remedy a
demonstrated problem, was upheld.
Yet in Ferrell, the court apparently abandoned the procedure followed
in Blackwell and adopted the procedure of the district court in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent School District,° which held that actions of
school officials "should not be limited to those instances where there is
material or substantial interference with school discipline."3'- The regula-
tion was promulgated by the schools and upheld by the court in Ferrell,
" 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
2  Id. at 749.
27 363 F.2d at 754.
28 363 F.2d at 748.
"
9See also Waugh v. Trustees of Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (up-
holding the right of college administrators to prohibit fraternities); Barker v.
Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) (upholding the suspension of
students involved in a demonstration for student power); Zanders v. Board of
Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) (upholding the suspension of
students involved in a sit-in demonstration in an administration building); Byrd
v. Gary, 184 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.S.C. 1960) (upholding the suspension of high
school students attempting to organize a milk boycott).
"0258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968). In Tinker the district court upheld a principal's
rule prohibiting students from wearing black arm bands in school. The court
recognized that the arm bands were a known symbol of protest against the
Viet Nam war, a symbolic form of expression protected under the first amendment.
"
1Id. at 973 (emphasis added).
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though disturbance was only "reasonably anticipated,"3 2 not present in
fact.33
Some courts have concentrated not on the right of free speech, but
on the right of privacy. Thus, they have refused to circumvent the more
apparent, if not appropriate, issue when approaching similar haircut
rules.3 ' Traditionally, the right of privacy has been dominated by the
common law concept of a man's home as his castle," and admittedly
hairstyle does not fall clearly within such a circumscribed theory. In
Davis v. Firment,36 a federal district court reasoned that a student's
right of privacy to have his hairstyle left alone neither came from specific
constitutional provisions37 nor was so sacred or fundamental s as the
right to marital privacy affirmed in Griswold v. Connecticut.39 But other
recent Court decisions emphasize that the concept of privacy is not con-
fined to the place, but rather to the person. In Katz v. United States,40
the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment freedom from unrea-
sonable governmental interference "protected people, not places."'" Sim-
ilarly, the Court, in Terry v. Ohio,42 reasoned that the right of personal
security "belongs as much to the citizen in the streets of our cities as
2 Id. at 973.
" In Ferrell the petitioners had been refused enrollment; thus the school
officials did not know from empirical observation that the students' hair style
would be a source of disruption in fact, but based their opinion on past experi-
ences with different students.
,See note 18 supra.
But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the Court de-
scribed the fourth and fifth amendments as protection against all governmental
invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
" 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).87 Id. at 529. The court felt that Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was based on "penumbras" of the
first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments which enabled citizens to create certain
zones of privacy that government could not force the citizen to surrender to
his detriment.
" Id. at 529. The court infers that Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), meant that although the
right of marital privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the ninth
amendment reminds us that there are other fundamental rights implicit in the
fourteenth amendment's meaning of liberty, the right to marital privacy being
such a fundamental right.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute un-
constitutional because its enforcement would violate the individual's right to pri-
vacy).
, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (use of an electronic listening device to record a con-
versation in a public telephone booth).
"Id. at 351.
"392 U.S. 1 (1968) (right of a police officer to "stop and frisk" on reason-
able suspicion). See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
19681
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to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." 48
In applying this reasoning, a student should be entitled to a certain modi-
cum of privacy, notwithstanding his presence in a public institution.
Dictating the proper hairstyle to be worn in public school could be
unreasonably "intruding upon the sanctity of the person,"44 for unlike
freedom buttons or armbands, official proscription of long hair during
school hours affects the student in his home. Hair is obviously too much
a natural and fundamental characteristic of the person to be put on and
off, according to school schedule. Although the official intrusion upon
the student's privacy is not as blatant or as confined to the home as the
intrusion upon marital privacy in Griswold,45 a student should have a
right to be free from unreasonable governmental interference with his
person at any hour or place.46 Just as unreasonable restraints on the
street corner may be reasonable restraints in the class room,4 7 even rea-
sonable restraints on the street corner or class room could well be unrea-
sonable restraints when affecting the student not only at school, but also
at home.48
Besides possibly infringing on the individual student's right to be
left alone, banning long hair in public schools could "unreasonably inter-
fere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control."4 But in Leonard v.
School Committee, ° the Massachusetts court upheld the suspension of
a student musician with long hair, finding neither an abuse of discre-
tion nor an unreasonable invasion of family privacy by school officials. 51
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicates adherence
to the policy of other courts in readily allowing school officials to
promulgate ad hoc rules. Apparently, these school regulations will be
' 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
"Id. at 17.
"381 U.S. 510 (1965).
"See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
392 F.2d at 704-05 (concurring opinion).
48 Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), with Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 510 (1965).
,Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965), noted in 1 PORTIA L.J. 258 (1966).
The court in Leonard reasoned that rules governing the appearance of stu-
dents were subject to limited court review, and that rules adopted by authorized
school officials would be presumed to be based on reasonable deliberation, unless
convinced there could be no reasonable connection with the rule and the successful
operation of the school. "[J]ust as with any unusual, immodest or exaggerated
mode of dress . . . conspicuous haircuts could result in the distraction of other
students." Id. at 710, 212 N.E.2d at 472.
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upheld as a reasonable exercise of official discretion, though perhaps
infringing on the student's constitutional right of privacy. In balancing
the "gravity of the 'evil' ,52 with the restraint on the right of privacy
and possible first amendment intrusions, courts will uphold, as a reason-
able exercise of official discretion, school regulations intended to avert
potential sources of harm. The source of harm need not in fact be
realized in the particular case for the regulation to be upheld. The
court in Ferrell may have adopted this position to discourage stu-
dents from testing these ad hoc rules at school, and subsequently
in court, and to insure an efficient education for a majority of
students, though curtailing a right of others. Adherence to such a policy
will build fences amounting to a corral for the "mustangs and maver-
icks ' 5 3 wishing to attend public school.
JoHN E. BUGG
Criminal Law-The Rehabilitative Ideal Activated by the
Sentencing Process
INTRODUCTION
All too often the concept of rehabilitation within the criminal process
is embraced by the academic community, but spurned by the black robes
of the judiciary. Archaic myths and prejudices, interwoven into the pur-
poses and goals of the criminal law, have resulted in an "antiquated crim-
inal code, which is riveted together by outworn tradition like the iron cuff
about the ankle of a chain gang prisoner,"1 and beyond which the judici-
ary, historically, has failed to see.
In the case of People v. Jones,' an Illinois Appellate Court clearly rec-
ognized the rehabilitative ideal within the criminal system and applied it
to a twenty year old high school boy. The defendant had been convicted
of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to the state penitentiary for
not less than six nor more than ten years.3 The trial court found that the
12 392 F.2d at 702.
"' Pollit, Free Speech for Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REv. 39, 54
(1967).
1 Note, Indeterminate Sentence Laws-The Adolescence of Peno-Correctional
Legislation, 50 HARV. L. REv. 677, 686 (1937).
2 Ill. App. 2d -, 235 N.E.2d 379 (1968).
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3(c) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1964) reads as follows:
"A person convicted of involuntary manslaughter shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary from one to ten years."
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